The Air National Guard's unified appeal to Congress for sustained, multiyear purchases of new F‑35A and F‑15EX fighters crystallizes a growing operational crisis: decades of deferred modernization have left the U.S. fighter enterprise brittle, and Guard commanders warn that current procurement plans fall short of preventing a shrinking, less survivable air fleet. This report synthesizes the immediate facts, places the request in historical perspective, and assesses the broader geopolitical consequences for U.S. deterrence, allied assurance, and the domestic defense industrial base.
Immediate Situation: Guard Leaders Seek a Minimum of 72 Fighters Per Year
Twenty-two Air National Guard adjutants general have for the first time presented a fully unified ask to congressional appropriators: statutory multiyear procurement that establishes a baseline annual buy of 48 F‑35A Lightning IIs and 24 F‑15EX Eagle IIs, with a preferred target of 72 F‑35As and 36 F‑15EXs (108 total) per year. Their appeal frames the requirement as operational feedback from commanders responsible for forward-deployed and combat-coded squadrons, not narrow parochial lobbying. The Guard argues that procurement levels below roughly 72 fighters annually equate to a real contraction of U.S. fighter capacity rather than mere stabilization.
Operationally, Guard units are contending with aging platforms, increasing maintenance burdens, and constrained flight hours that degrade pilot proficiency. Unit-level practices—cannibalizing parts to keep aircraft flying and accepting higher maintenance tempo—are short‑term fixes that raise long‑term risk in contested environments. Given current Air Force budget requests and historical buy rates, the adjutants general estimate that full recapitalization of the force will require another decade or more even if higher annual buys are sustained.
Historical Context: Decades of Buy Rates, Aging Airframes, and the Move to Fifth-Generation Fighters
Since the late 1990s, U.S. annual fighter procurement has been intermittent and generally below levels needed to offset attrition, retirements, and capability obsolescence. The last year with more than 72 fighters procured was 1998; since then, acquisition rhythms have been shaped by competing budget priorities, force-structure debates, and a long transition from legacy fourth‑generation fleets toward a mixed inventory centered on the F‑35 family and modernized fourth‑generation types like the F‑15EX.
Overlapping budget cycles and program backlogs have produced boom‑and‑bust production spikes that strain suppliers and training pipelines. Multiyear procurement authorities historically lower unit costs and stabilize industrial output; conversely, year‑to‑year uncertainty increases sustainment costs and complicates workforce planning. The recent push reflects both the technical imperative to replace 30–40 year‑old airframes and the strategic imperative embodied in the latest National Defense Strategy to present a force that is sufficiently numerous and resilient to deter or fight peer competitors.
Caption: Vermont Air National Guard F‑35A lands during a European deployment, demonstrating modernized Guard capabilities | Credits: Master Sgt. Ryan Campbell/Air National Guard
Geopolitical Impact: Deterrence, Alliance Burdens, and Industrial Capacity Risks
At the strategic level, sufficient fighter procurement is a force‑multiplier for U.S. deterrence. Numerically robust, modern fighter inventories underpin air superiority, sustain credible theater defense, and enable coalition interoperability. A shrinking U.S. fighter fleet would increase operational demands on allies, complicate burden‑sharing arrangements, and potentially force adjustments in forward posture or escalation control strategies. In scenarios of high intensity conflict, reduced availability of combat‑coded aircraft would constrain surge capacity and lengthen timelines for reinforcing theaters of interest.
The request also spotlights the industrial base: steady multiyear orders for F‑35 and F‑15EX variants would stabilize supplier lines, reduce per‑unit costs, and accelerate closure of backlogs, while stopping or slowing buys risks workforce attrition and supply‑chain erosion that could take years to reverse. For partners and export customers, predictable U.S. procurement supports global sustainment ecosystems that many allies rely on; interruptions would have cascading effects on allied readiness and interoperability.
Finally, the debate over procurement levels is inherently political. Congress controls appropriations and multiyear contracting authority; its choices will determine whether the Air Force and Guard can match strategic requirements with materiel and training. Absent higher, sustained buys and concurrent investments in maintenance, training, and personnel retention, U.S. airpower risks becoming less survivable and less credible at a moment when peer competitors are fielding increasingly sophisticated integrated air defenses and strike systems.